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COASTAL ENERGY SITING DILEMMAS
RUSSELL V. RANDLE*
INTRODUCTION
Discussions about coastal management and energy facility siting
often belie the complexity of the problem. The federal coastal man-
agement program was designed to assert control over development of
thousands of miles of shoreline, and the mental picture of endless
beach seems to have influenced Congress' deliberations on this stat-
ute. 1 This mental picture is vast and impressive, yet it, like the stat-
ute it informs, is largely irrelevant to the siting of necessary, dirty,
and occasionally dangerous facilities like refineries and liquid gas ter-
minals. The construction of these facilities at a few dozen ports de-
pends on difficult political decisions about energy, environment,
safety, and social effects, and difficult legal decisions about how to
reconcile conflicting statutory objectives while deciding what roles
the states and the federal government will play. This article discusses
these political and legal decisions and suggests how they should be
made.
The combination of the large scale and destructive potential of
presently contemplated energy facilities, and the acute vulnerability
of the coastal environment and port cities, seems to assure angry
political confrontations over the construction of these facilities. In
heavily populated and developed port areas, refineries and oil termi-
nals may violate minimum environmental standards because of air
and water quality degradation already caused by existing facilities.
Similarly, liquified natural gas terminals in these areas may place
hundreds of thousands of lives at risk because of accidental detona-
tion.
In less developed port areas, the problems will be different, but
the confrontations may be no less angry. In these areas the local pop-
ulace often depends on tourism and fishing for its survival. These
*B.A., Princeton University, 1977; J.D., Yale Law School, 1980; admitted to District of
Columbia Bar, 1980. The author thanks Professor John D. Costlow, Professor Quintin John-
stone, the Duke University Marine Laboratory, and the Yale Environmental Law Association
for support, counsel, and encouragement through this work. The views expressed here are
the author's own.
1. Federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (FCZMA), 16 U.S.C. § § 1451-1464
(1976).
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labor intensive, seasonal industries are especially vulnerable to water
pollution and aesthetic degradation. Capital intensive, dirty facilities
like refineries may threaten the livelihood of these areas without
helping the people displaced from fishing and tourism. While liquid
gas terminals place fewer people at risk in these less developed ports,
an explosion of one of these facilities still might kill hundreds or
thousands of people. Thus the construction of energy facilities in any
port seems to assure a bitterly contested political decision, and paral-
ysis or delay in the siting of necessary energy facilities.
Analysis of this confrontation and delay is important in evaluating
the federal government's present approach to coastal energy siting.
Part I of this article examines the rural and urban patterns of oppo-
sition which have brought siting to a near standstill. Part II explores
the possibility of using a tradeoff principle as a means to compromise
these disputes and expedite siting.
Parts III, IV, and V examine disputes over the siting of a liquid
propane gas (LPG) terminal and an oil refinery in coastal North Caro-
lina in order to understand the obstacles to using a tradeoff approach.
These sections present three major obstacles to a successful tradeoff
policy for siting: preemption of important regulatory matters by the
federal government; fragmentation of permit processes and appeals;
and failure of these state and federal regulatory programs adequately
to address liability and insurance aspects of these facilities. Finally,
this article suggests the sort of institutional arrangement necessary to
site these facilities at an acceptable speed in an acceptable manner
through the use of the tradeoff principle, consolidated permit and
appellate proceedings, and appropriate substantive protections.
I. PATTERNS OF OPPOSITION
When Congress enacted the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act
(FCZMA) in 1972, coastal facilities needed to handle rapidly increas-
ing oil imports were not being built. They remain unbuilt today,
largely because coastal residents on the Atlantic seaboard have
blocked their construction for environmental reasons. These resi-
dents correctly see environmental degradation from oil spills and air
and water pollution as threats to the livelihood of the fishing and
recreation industries, and to health and property.
From a national standpoint, however, a de facto ban on coastal in-
stallations has serious economic, environmental, and energy draw-
backs. Economically, the defeat of east coast deepwater port pro-
posals means that the eastern United States cannot be served directly
by supertankers, thus doubling transportation costs and hindering
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United States' merchant marine attempts to compete in the world
market.' Likewise, the defeat of east coast refinery proposals in-
creases dependence not only on foreign refineries, but on older, less
efficient domestic refineries as well. 3
Neither are environmental consequences of a de facto ban on deep-
water port construction wholly benign. Oil spill chances may be in-
creased overall because oil cannot be directly transferred from super-
tankers to port terminals. Instead, oil must be transferred twice:
once from the supertankers at sea to a lightering tanker, and once
from this smaller tanker to a conventional port. Reliance on these
smaller ships increases tanker traffic in congested coastal areas, where
collisions, groundings, and resultant spills are most likely.' The de-
feat of refinery siting proposals also has had environmental draw-
backs by hindering efforts to supply low sulfur residual oil required
in urban areas along the east coast.'
Given these environmental, energy, and economic drawbacks, a de
facto ban on coastal energy installations is not likely to be the wisest
long run national policy. Since coastal residents have promoted this
policy through successful opposition to these facilities, it seems ap-
propriate to examine some of these siting disputes in order to discern
2. Both the U.S. Department of Commerce and Department of Treasury opposed Dela-
ware's attempts to block deepwater port construction in its waters. This opposition was
based on concern for the merchant marine industry and for the balance of payments. A
deepwater port would have made it possible for supertankers to serve the United States di-
rectly, cutting shipping costs and possibly promoting United States shipping interests. See
N.Y. Times, June 27, 1971, § 3, at 3, col. 5 (Commerce and Treasury positions); INSTI-
TUTE FOR WATER RESOURCES, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, 5 U.S. DEEP-
WATER PORT STUDY: TRANSPORT AND BENEFIT-COST RELATIONSHIPS 123-99
(1973) (comparing costs by ship size) [hereinafter cited as CORPS STUDY I.
3. Reliance on older, less regulated refineries will prevent this inherently dirty refining
capacity from being phased out with cleaner, more modern equipment. For a variety of
reasons, including possible heavy use, refinery maintenance has decreased substantially over
the past twenty years, with resultant deterioration in the physical condition of the refineries
and the quality of the surrounding air. Walker & Storper, Erosion of the Clean Air Act of
1970: A Study in the Failure of Government Regulation and Planning, 7 B.C. ENVT'L AFF.
L. REV. 189, 249-50 (1979).
4. Analysis of past major oil spills shows that these spills usually occur within ten miles
of shore and 25 miles of port. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-600/7-77-
016, ACCIDENTS AND UNSCHEDULED EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH NON-NUCLEAR
ENERGY RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY 82, 91 (1977).
5. Rapid increases in eastern U.S. demand for low sulfur residual oil in 1969 and 1970
created shortages, primarily because of insufficient refinery capacity. N.Y. Times, Sept. 27,
1970, § 4, at 12, col. 1. Only the addition of a new refinery at Freeport in the Bahamas
helped avert severe low sulfur fuel shortages during the winter of 1970. Id., Nov. 17, 1970,
at 47, col. 8. The Freeport refinery can accommodate 300,000 ton supertankers, unlike
United States refineries on the east coast. Id., Aug. 10, 1970, at 44, col. 2. More recently,
insufficient refinery capacity to produce unleaded gasoline may have contributed to fuel
shortages in 1979.
January 1981]
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the reasons for coastal communities' uniform hostility to these instal-
lations.
Machiasport and Hilton Head: Rural Opposition
During 1970 and 1971, proposals to build refineries and a deep-
water port at Machiasport, Maine, and a petrochemical complex near
Hilton Head, South Carolina, were abandoned. There are few better
examples to show why rural coastal communities so strongly oppose
construction of energy facilities in their midst.
It would be difficult to find two more physically different coastal
areas than Hilton Head and Machiasport. Hilton Head is a sandy bar-
rier island along the marshy South Carolina coast. Behind it are Port
Royal Sound and Victoria Bluffs, the site proposed by BASF, Inc. in
1969 for factories producing dye, plastics, and eventually, petro-
chemicals.6 The sound and surrounding waters are shallow, warm,
sluggish and productive.7
Machiasport lies on a rocky, glaciated headland on the Maine coast,
not far from the Canadian Border. The waters along the Maine coast
are cold, deep, and productive, with strong tides and rapid currents.
The weather is frequently foul and foggy.' Occidental Petroleum
proposed in 1968 to construct at Machiasport both a deepwater port
capable of handling large supertankers, and a 300,000 barrel/day oil
refinery.9 In 1969, Atlantic Richfield proposed a 100,000 barrel/day
refinery for the same area.' 0
The cultural differences between the two areas are as sharp as the
physical differences. Machiasport is "down east" Maine; the area
6. Id., Feb. 1, 1970, at 40, col. 4 (details of BASF proposal; local background).
7. Id.
8. The climate in Maine "is harsh and the seas are rough. The state has a heavy economic
dependency on tourism and fishing, especially sheilfishing." These industries are endangered
by oil spills, and especially so because "Maine's harsh winters inhibit the natural bacterial dis-
persion of oil spills. As a result, a spill in Maine could last much longer than one in an area
with a warmer climate." Comment, Maine's Coastal Conveyance of Oil Act: Jurisdictional
Considerations, 24 ME L. REV. 299, 307-08 (1972).
9. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1969, at 65, col. 3; id., Apr. 21, 1969, at 6, col. 4 (details of
proposal). Machias Bay and Casco Bay near Portland are the two best natural anchorages in
Maine. Other sites which might be equally serviceable are more or less "foreclosed because
of already developed recreational activities, narrow approaches, or inadequate space. The
configuration of Machias Bay is such that.., a docking facility attached directly to the land
could be constructed without dredging." COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 2
POTENTIAL ONSHORE EFFECTS OF DEEPWATER OIL TERMINAL-RELATED INDUS-
TRIAL DEVELOPMENT 3-2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CEQ REPORT].
10. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1969, at 39, col. 5 (details of Atlantic Richfield proposal).
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around Hilton Head, "deep south." The areas did have common eco-
nomic characteristics: high unemployment and heavy dependence on
tourism and fishing.''
The Machiasport and Hilton Head proposals followed reasonably
predictable political patterns: the Machiasport backers sought to
breach the federal oil import barrier' 2 and South Carolina officials
tried desperately to lure new industry into the state.' I In late 1969
and 1970, environmental concerns began to change familiar politics
drastically, overriding the differences between communities to pro-
duce strikingly similar patterns of opposition.
Similar vulnerabilities produced similar responses. In both commu-
nities, tourism and fishing were the backbone of the economy. Both
industries were labor intensive, employing many unskilled laborers,
and both were acutely vulnerable to oil spills and air and water pollu-
tion.
In Maine the environmental response came in February 1970 when
the state legislature enacted a bill to set up an Environmental Im-
provement Commission to determine whether proper sites had been
proposed for refineries, fuel terminals, and other utilities.' In addi-
tion, a tax of one-half cent per barrel was imposed on oil shipped into
the state in order to pay for oil spill clean-up costs.' I Not surpris-
ingly, the bill's initial supporters were the tourism and fishing indus-
tries, which had been mobilized in opposition to the Machiasport
proposal.' 6 By the time the bill came to a vote, general enthusiasm
for environmental legislation easily swept the legislation through.' I
The state legislation, coupled with the Nixon administration's further
11. The Machiasport unemployment rate was 11.5% when the national rate was 4.0%,
id., Apr. 21, 1969, at 6, col. 4; unemployment in Beaufort County (where Hilton Head is
located) was also worse than the national average, especially among the black one-third of
the population. Id., Feb. 1, 1970, at 40, col. 4. Illiteracy and malnutrition were also severe
problems in the county. Id.; Nutrition and Human Needs: Hearings on Part 4-South Caro-
lina Before the Senate Select Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1162-67 (1969) (statement
of Senator Hollings).
12. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1969, at 65, col. 3; id., Feb. 11, 1969, at 41, col. 4;
id., Feb. 21, 1969, at 1, col. 4.
13. See id., Jan. 11, 1970, at 48, col. 4; id., Feb. 1, 1970, at 40, col. 4;id., March 15,
1970, at 57, col. 3; id., Apr. 8, 1970, at 70, col. 3 (giving political background).
14. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § § 481-488 (1978 & Supp. 1980-81).
15. Id. tit. 38, § 551 (1978 & Supp. 1980-81).
16. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1970, at 44, col. 2 (editorial). See also Message of Governor
Kenneth M. Curtis to the Legislature of Maine (Jan. 6, 1970), reprinted in 1971 Me. Acts
1471, 1484 (discussing proposals for laws governing the coastal conveyances of oil and in-
dustrial site location).
17. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1970, at 1, col. 6.
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delay in considering the oil import quota application,' 8 blocked the
Machiasport project.' 9
South Carolina Governor Robert E. McNair announced the BASF
proposal early in October 1969. By January 1970, an unlikely coali-
tion had formed in opposition, comprised of fishermen from the large
all-black fishing cooperative, resort owners from Hilton Head, two
integrated civic associations, and national environmental groups.2
Although the project's backers argued that it would create 600 per-
manent jobs, including 160 for unskilled labor, the black community
was skeptical of claims that local residents would be hired and trained
to replace the skilled German workers who would initially operate
the plant.' Moreover, there was considerable doubt that the jobs
brought into the county by the plant would replace all those elimi-
nated in fishing and tourism. Black fishermen pointed to the demise
of shell fishing in the nearby Savannah River caused by pollution
from chemical factories.2 2 One civic association claimed that for
every job created by the plant, three would be lost in fishing and
tourism. 2 3
This unlikely union of opponents fought the BASF proposal skill-
fully and with an intensity foreign to South Carolina politics.
2 4
Counsel experienced in environmental matters were retained, and in
February, one of the first suits under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) was filed.2 5 On March 15, despite backing for the
18. Id., Feb. 21, 1970, at 1, col. 3.
19. After the Fuel Desulfurization proposal to build a refinery at Long Island was de-
feated, see page 132 infra, the company proposed construction at South Portland and then
Searsport, Maine. The first alternative was rejected by the South Portland City Council in
1970; the second by Maine's Environmental Improvement Commission (EIC) in 1971 after
extensive hearings. N.Y. Times, March 23, 1971, at 36, col. 2. The EIC administered the
state's industrial site location law, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § § 481-488 (1978),
which requires persons proposing to construct industrial installations larger than a certain
size to obtain a permit to do so. Id. § 482(2) (1978) (size requirements). The permit appli-
cant has the burden of proving that the installation will comply with a variety of environ-
mental criteria specified in the statute. Id. § 484(1)-(4) (1978) (criteria); In the Matter of
Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., 310 A.2d 736, 747 (Me. 1973) (burden of proof).
The EIC rejected the Searsport application because of insufficient financial capacity to
pay for pollution controls and a likelihood of continuous oil spillage in violation of water
quality standards. Id. at 752-57 (findings supported by substantial evidence). The Searsport
dispute is a classic example of the patterns of opposition seen in other rural coastal areas.
See L. CALDWELL, L. HAYES, I. MACWHIRTER, CITIZENS AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
CASE STUDIES IN POPULAR ACTION 210-18 (1976) (importance of fishing and tourism
interests in Searsport dispute) [hereinafter cited as CITIZENS AND THE ENVIRONMENT].
20. See CITIZENS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 19, at 61-63; N.Y. Times,
Jan. 11, 1970, at 48, col. 3;id., Feb. 1, 1970, at 40, col. 4.
21. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1970, at 40, col. 4 (attitudes of black community).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id., Feb. 12, 1970, at 42, col 8.
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project from the governor and the legislature, the South Carolina Pol-
lution Control Authority announced that it would delay for one year
issuing BASF a water pollution discharge permit in order to study
the effects of the discharge on receiving waters. The real reason may
have been to allow the state legislature time to finish rewriting the
state's lax water pollution control law.2 6
On March 27, Secretary of Interior Walter Hickel forcefully inter-
vened and informed BASF that the Department of Interior would
oppose the project in a variety of ways. To begin with, the Federal
Water Pollution Control Administration, which was then part of the
Department of Interior, would veto any permit which did not assure
nondegradation of the Colleton River, into which the plant would
discharge.2 Although the federally approved water quality standard
for the river (which discharged into Port Royal Sound) was quite lax,
the state's agreement with Interior included a nondegradation clause
which the FWPCA would assuredly invoke to veto the discharge per-
mit.2 I Secretary Hickel further informed BASF that under authority
of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act,2 9 he would oppose the
dredging proposed to make the project accessible to naphtha tankers
bringing feedstock for the petrochemical portion of the facility.3
Hickel also stated that he had no authority under the oil import
quota programs to permit the importation of the 40,000 barrels per
day of naphtha BASF proposed to bring in.3 BASF capitulated.
Early in April construction was suspended; in July further delay was
announced; and in January 1971 the project was abandoned. 32
Thus Machiasport and Beaufort County, two very different rural
coastal communities, reacted in a strikingly similar fashion to block
proposals for major coastal energy or industrial installations. These
projects promised severe environmental degradation and threatened
the survival of the tourism and fishing industries, and thus the liveli-
hood of many, including the poorest residents. The coalition among
the tourism and fishing industries and environmentalists which
emerged was a pattern of opposition which would reappear in other
26. Id., March 15, 1970, at 57, col. 3. A stricter water pollution control statute was be-
fore the legislature at that time.
27. Id., March 27, 1970, at 47, col. 6.
28. Id.
29. 16 U.S.C. § § 661-666c (1976). Section 662(a) requires public or private agencies
proposing to impound, divert, or deepen the channel of any stream or waterbody to consult
first with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
30. BASF proposed to dredge a channel 25 feet deep, 400 feet wide, and 13/ miles long,
in order to accommodate small, 200-foot long naphtha tankers. N.Y. Times, March 27, 1970,
at 47, col. 6.
31. Id.
32. Id. at Apr. 8, 1970, at 70, col. 3;id., Jan. 15, 1971, at 14, col. 1.
January 1981]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
energy disputes in small coastal communities. In larger, more urban
coastal communities, the patterns of opposition would be different,
but equally effective.
Long Island and Delaware: Urban Opposition
Both Machiasport in coastal Maine and Beaufort County in South
Carolina are similar: more or less poor and more or less rural. In con-
trast, Delaware and eastern Long Island, the only feasible deepwater
port sites on the east coast besides Maine, are both reasonably pros-
perous and facing rapid urbanization. Neither Delaware nor eastern
Long Island depends upon commercial fishing, but both have thriving
recreation industries and many full or part-time residents who live
there precisely because the areas were not industrialized. Conse-
quently, refineries and deepwater ports, with their promise of severe
air and water pollution and oil spills, are not welcome neighbors.
The hostility first appeared on Long Island. On March 27, 1970,
the same day that Secretary Hickel helped defeat the BASF proposal
for Beaufort County, the Northville town planning board rejected a
rezoning proposal to permit construction of a 100,000 barrel/day re-
finery.3 3 Northville is a small town on eastern Long Island Sound,
and one of the few sites on the east coast with the potential of han-
dling supertankers. (The refinery would have been served from super-
tankers unloading by pipeline three to five miles offshore).3" Local
residents formed an environmental group called "It Stinks" to oppose
the refinery.3 Ironically enough, Fuel Desulfurization, Inc., which
had proposed the refinery, had secured its 100,000 barrel/day import
quota for the express purpose of desulfurizing residual oil to meet air
pollution control regulations.3 6
The rejection of the Northville proposal had serious policy impli-
cations, as did the opposition to proposals to dredge Port Jefferson,
Long Island to accommodate supertankers,3" but it was Delaware's
33. Id., Apr. 1, 1970, at 45, col. 1.
34. Id.
35. Local residents cited air and water pollution problems, including the effects of oil
spills on the local recreation industry. Id.
36. For the long and intricate history of Fuel Desulfurization, Inc.'s successful attempts
to secure the oil import quota from the Department of Interior for desulfurizing fuel oil to
meet Clean Air Act standards, see J. ESPOSITO, VANISHING AIR 248-58 (1970).
37. The Corps of Engineers had authorization since 1968 to dredge Port Jefferson Har-
bor, but no money had been appropriated. N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1972, at 85, col. 1. The
Mayor of Port Jefferson opposed the project, id., Aug. 29, 1971, at 71, col. 3, as did Sena-
tors Javits and Buckley, who instead persuaded Congress to appropriate money for a Corps
study of east coast port needs. Consolidated Oil proposed a similar dredging project for Port
Jefferson, in order to accommodate supertankers and reduce the number of marine oil ter-
minal sites on Long Island from 40 to 12. The timing of the proposal was inauspicious: it
was announced the day a tanker broke in two and sank in the harbor. Id., Jan. 11, 1972, at
48, col. 3.
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statutory rejection of deepwater port and refinery proposals which
raised the most serious national policy questions about coastal en-
ergy siting. In July, 1971, the Delaware Legislature enacted a coastal
area zoning bill which forbade construction of oil refineries, petro-
chemical complexes, steel mills, and pulp and paper mills anywhere
on the Delaware coast.' 8 The statute also forbade construction of
deepwater port facilities in Delaware's half of Delaware Bay and three
miles out into the Atlantic Ocean.' 9
Passage of the statute ended a dispute which had begun in 1969
when Shell Oil Company proposed to construct on a 5600-acre site it
owned near Smyrna, Delaware, a refinery which was to be served
from a deepwater port three miles from shore on the Delaware Bay.' I
At approximately the same time that Shell proposed its refinery,
Zapata Norness proposed a large deepwater port in Delaware Bay for
the export of coal and import of iron ore in massive ore-bulk-oil
(OBO) vessels."'
These proposals were thought to threaten the unspoiled character
of the southern two-thirds of the state's coast in three ways. The first
threat was pollution from the refinery and port; the second, rapid in-
dustrial growth and additional pollution from the heavy industry
attracted by the port and petrochemical complex; and third, rapid
urbanization to accommodate the influx of workers needed to con-
struct and operate the new facilities." 2 These threats were very real
to Delaware residents, for the northern third of the coast was the site
of a major refinery, several chemical works, a steel mill, and a power
plant.4 a Air and water pollution from these facilities were severe
problems, and that area of the Delaware coast was of little use for
recreation.4" The development of the state's coast threatened both
38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § § 7001-7013 (1974) (prohibition).
39. Id., tit. 7, § 7003 (1974).
40. SEN. COMMERCE COMM., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED IN 1974 AND 1976, at 256-81 (1976).
41. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1971, § 3, at 3, col. 5. Zapata had proposed to construct a
300-acre offshore island, 9000 feet long and 1500 feet wide, capable of storing three million
tons of coal sent by barge from Newport News, Virginia. Id. This coal probably would be
coking or metallurgical coal from the southern Appalachians. The terminal's construction
would have cut transportation cost to Japan and would have allowed American producers to
compete more effectively with the Australian metallurgical coal now dominating the Japa-
nese market.
42. Id., June 27, 1971, § 3, at 3, col. 5;id., June 29, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
43. For location of existing facilities see 2 CORPS STUDY, supra note 2, at 27, figure 6.
44. "The Bay waters have contained a high level of pollution for many years. The bay is
subject to pollution from industrial chemicals, oils, insecticides, and domestic wastes. This
pollution is primarily associated with the heavily populated and industrialized region in the
upper estuary and along the Delaware River." 4 CORPS STUDY, supra note 2, at 137. For
discussion of air pollution problems around Wilmington and the bay area, see CEQ REPORT,
supra note 9.
Despite these severe air and water pollution problems, the most serious environmental
January 19811
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to ruin the state's recreation industry and to exacerbate the severe
environmental problems caused by existing industrial facilities.
Governor Russell W. Peterson forcefully sponsored the coastal
zoning bill, and secured its passage largely because of intense citizen
opposition to these installations." s "I have become convinced," he
said, "that performance controls are not an effective enough safe-
guard for refineries and related petrochemical industries or steel and
paper mills."' 6 Both the recreation industry and those concerned
with abating existing pollution problems in Delaware supported the
governor in this judgment.
The Delaware statute was vigorously opposed and disputed, not
only by Shell and the other companies hoping to build in the area,4 7
but by the U.S. Treasury and Commerce Departments, which were
anxious to keep Delaware Bay open for deepwater port development
in order to promote U.S. export trade, cut oil transportation costs,
and make the U.S. merchant marine more competitive.48 The affected
industries, labor groups, and federal agencies lobbied intensively
against the statute's enactment. Shell took the state legislature on a
tour of its "clean" refinery in Louisiana; Secretary of Commerce
Maurice Stans publicly questioned Governor Peterson's patriotism .4
Neither approach succeeded in reversing the general perception that
development of major energy facilities along the coast would inevi-
tably lead to severe environmental and aesthetic degradation. The
statute was enacted and made a great part of Delaware and Delaware
Bay (perhaps the best refinery and deepwater port locations on the
east coast) off-limits for major energy development.
II. TRADEOFFS
Although the FCZMA was enacted in 1972, it was to have remark-
ably little effect upon coastal energy siting disputes in the 1970s.
There were several reasons for this. To begin with, states had to pre-
threat posed by the proposed refinery and deepwater port would be the destruction of the
state's extensive coastal wetlands along the bay. These wetlands are close to being in original
condition south of the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, and are the most sensitive link in the
bay's ecosystem. See 4 CORPS STUDY, supra note 2, at 139-40.
45. N.Y. Times, July 16, 1972, § 3, at 1, col. 6 (Governor's discussion of extraordinary
citizen support).
46. Id., June 29, 1971, at 61, col. 1.
47. Shell, Zapata Norness, and Bechtel opposed the bill because it would block proposed
construction. Bechtel had proposed a liquid natural gas (LNG) terminal. Id., June 29, 1971,
at 61, col. 1;id., June 27, 1971, § 3, at 3, col. S.
48. Id., June 27, 1971, § 3, at 3, col. 5.
49. Id., July 16, 1972, § 3, at 1, col. 6; id., June 29, 1971, at 1, col. 2; id., June 27,
1971, § 3, at 3, col. 5.
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pare elaborate and enforceable plans for their coastal zones, a lengthy
and delicate task. The Nixon administration slowed things further by
impounding the money appropriated for the first year of the pro-
gram." 0 Thus federally approved coastal management plans were not
in place for the major refinery and fuel terminal siting disputes in the
later 1970s: those at Long Beach, California; Portsmouth, Virginia;
and Eastport, Maine.'
Yet even if such plans had been in place, it is doubtful they would
have changed these disputes substantially, because the dispute con-
cerned substantive environmental standards promulgated under other
federal statutes. The Long Beach and Portsmouth projects threatened
a large increase in hydrocarbon emissions in areas which already vio-
lated federal standards for photochemical smog."2 Moreover, poten-
tial oil spills from the proposed Portsmouth project could eliminate
blue crabs from commercial fishing in the Chesapeake Bay," 3 while
pollution from the proposed Eastport refinery would threaten bald
eagles and whales, both endangered species. 1
4
The Long Beach and Portsmouth disputes are especially good ex-
amples of the pattern of opposition discernible in the Delaware and
Long Island controversies, where urban or urbanizing areas react
against the threat of additional air or water pollution. In the Long
Beach and Portsmouth situations, the disputes were more sharply
focused because the proposed facilities threatened severe air and
water pollution in areas already in violation of federal standards.
The FCZMA specifically did not affect any requirements of the
50. Zile, A Legislative-Political History of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 1
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT 235, 273-74 (1974).
51. California had a state coastal zone management program and Maine had an industrial
site location statute, see note 14 supra, but neither of these programs was federally approved
under the FCZMA at the time these disputes arose and state agencies made their decisions.
The Maine Board of Environmental Protection approved the Eastport refinery's application.
See In the Matter of Pittston Co. Oil Refinery, 375 A.2d 530 (Me. 1977) (challenges by
other state agencies not permitted). The California Coastal Resources Commission approved
the Long Beach Terminal, but not accompanying storage tanks. See 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA)
1309 (1978).
52. Hydrocarbon emissions are the chemical precursor of photochemical oxidants (now
expressed in EPA standards as ozone).
53. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) opposes the Ports-
mouth refinery, and did so in the EIS review, because of the threat to the blue crab popula-
tion of the Chesapeake Bay, which congregates on the shoals near the mouth of the bay
(and near the refinery site) during the winter months for spawning. A spill at this time could
devastate the Chesapeake crab fishery, a $39,000,000 per year industry responsible for three-
quarters of the crab caught on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts. 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1647
(1979).
54. The Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of Interior opposes granting an
NPDES permit to the Eastport refinery because of the threat to whales. 10 ENVIR. REP.
(BNA) 234-35 (1979).
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Clean Air and Clean Water Acts,' I nor did it set any kind of siting
standards. Congressional political considerations aside, there were
sensible reasons not to impose specific siting standards on energy
facilities at the time the statute was enacted. To begin with, it is un-
clear whether workable national siting or zoning standards could
have been written at that time. Considerable legal uncertainty sur-
rounded other federal environmental regulations and statutes,5 6 and
there was no clear national energy policy. Moreover, two important
technical uncertainties made the setting of uniform standards diffi-
cult; these were the effect of site-specific factors on environmental
impacts5 7 and present and future control technology capabilities.' 8
Second, intelligent siting of energy installations required flexible
balancing of a great many factors. Because sites were limited by engi-
neering and commercial considerations, and because the facilities
could inflict severe damage even when they complied with air and
water pollution control requirements, difficult decisions were inevi-
table. These kinds of decisions requiring detailed analyses are more
easily made where there is sufficient flexibility to account for the
legitimate interests of coastal opponents to these facilities.
These difficult decisions have not been made under the FCZMA,
but under the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, under NEPA, and
under other environmental statutes. It would be instructive to exam-
ine these decisions to see if workable principles have evolved to de-
cide these hard cases.
Long Beach: Evolution of the Tradeoff Principle
Of eight major oil companies that combined to build the Trans-
Alaskan Oil Pipeline, only one, Standard Oil of Ohio (SOHIO), lacked
refinery capacity on the west coast to process its Alaskan crude.
From 1975 to 1979, SOHIO attempted to obtain the approvals nec-
essary to build a supertanker terminal at Long Beach, California, in
order to ship its oil to Gulf Coast refineries by pipeline instead of by
tanker through the Panama Canal. SOHIO finally obtained the neces-
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(f) (Supp. III 1979).
56. At the time the FCZMA was enacted, Congress was extensively amending the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 stat. 816 (1972). State implemen-
tation plans (SIPs) had recently been filed (Jan. 1972) under the Clean Air Act, and were
being challenged in every U.S. court of appeals, the courts of first instance for such chal-
lenges.
57. The proximity of Great Dismal Swamp (an excellent natural emitter of hydrocar-
bons) to the Portsmouth refinery site is an example of these site specific factors.
58. Forcing rapid control technology improvements through stringent regulation is a
deliberate and to some extent successful strategy of the Clean Air Act. See Note, Forcing
Technology: The Clean Air Act Experience, 88 YALE L.J. 1713 (1979).
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sary permits in 1979, but abandoned the project because regulatory
delay had increased project costs substantially and because the per-
mits would be the object of extended litigation.' I
The SOHIO dispute arose in the following fashion. The company
sought to construct a supertanker terminal at Long Beach, California,
in order to land its Alaskan crude, and to ship the oil through a gas
pipeline to Midland, Texas, where it would be shipped via existing
pipelines to SOHIO's Gulf Coast refineries.6 The proposal would
have permitted drastic reductions in transportation costs by shorten-
ing the distance to the refineries and by permitting the substitution
of supertankers and pipelines for the more expensive tankers used to
ship oil through the Panama Canal. The proposal also had significant
environmental advantages because the possibility of oil spills was
lower for this route than for shipment into other west coast ports or
through the canal. 6 ' Unfortunately, Long Beach, like the rest of the
South Coast Air Basin, was and is in violation of national standards
for ozone, and hydrocarbon emissions are a precursor of ozone.6 2
Under the Clean Air Act as administered in 1975, the Long Beach
terminal probably could not have been built, for it would have exac-
erbated severe violations of air quality standards.6 3 It was in 1975
and 1976, as SOHIO, California, and the federal EPA sought to accom-
modate construction of the terminal without violating the air act,
that the emission offset or tradeoff concept was first approved by
the federal government. 64 Construction of the terminal would be
permitted if SOHIO would control a sufficient quantity of emissions
from other sources to offset the remaining emissions from its termi-
nal after stringent controls were applied to it. Although the specific
tradeoffs between the terminal operations and other sources were
hotly disputed in California air quality permit hearings through 1977
and 1978,61 the emission tradeoff principle developed in those dis-
putes was embodied in an EPA interpretative ruling for the whole
country in 1976,66 and in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,67
59. See 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2099-2100 (1979) (announcement of abandonment and
statement of reasons).
60. Id., at 1309 (1978).
61. Telephone interview with Capt. Dan Charter, Chief, Port Safety and Law Enforce-
ment Division, U.S.C.G. H.Q., Washington, D.C. (Dec. 12, 1978).
62. 40 C.F.R. § 81.305 (1979) (nonattainment area designations).
63. See Walker & Storper, supra note 3, at 237-38 (discussing SOHIO dispute).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1457-58 (1978) (detailing elaborate tradeoff re-
quirements laid down in the course of the hearings).
66. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976).
67. Clean Air Act, § § 170-178, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ § 7501-7508 (Supp. 11 1978)).
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and was used to resolve several difficult disputes about the air quality
impacts of siting other installations.' I
One of the most notable uses of the tradeoff policy has been to
facilitate the possible siting of the proposed Portsmouth refinery.69
The Portsmouth area, like Long Beach, is a nonattainment area for
ozone. Under the tradeoff principle, a variety of offsets have been
arranged in order to accommodate the refinery's emissions, which
will themselves be stringently controlled. The State of Virginia will
pave its roads in the area with concrete instead of asphalt; other
hydrocarbon emissions will also be controlled.7 Although the details
of the offsets are still a matter of dispute between environmentalists,
EPA, and the refinery," I these disputes about air quality impacts will
probably be settled within the framework of the tradeoff policy.
Extensions and Limitations of the Tradeoff Principle
The tradeoff principle is now embodied in the nonattainment area
provisions of the Clean Air Act, and has removed a serious obstacle
to the siting of coastal energy installations. Before the principle may
be applied generally to break the deadlock over coastal energy siting,
two major alterations must be made. In order to apply the tradeoff
in small coastal communities, some basis besides environmental dam-
age must be used to make the offset. And in order to use the tradeoff
principle to resolve other kinds of environmental protection and
safety disputes about coastal energy installations, some difficult prac-
tical problems must be confronted. Finally, some limitations of the
offset principle itself must be acknowledged.
In rural coastal communities, such as Hilton Head and Machiasport,
there is seldom sufficient air or water pollution from other sources to
work as a basis for a tradeoff. Even though a proposed installation
meets stringent standards, and provides controls for any other pollu-
tion sources amenable to control, there is still likely to be a large
quantum of environmental damage from air and water pollution. The
fishing and recreation industries are likely to remain threatened, and
thus vehemently opposed to siting the installation nearby.
A variety of tradeoffs are possible, the simplest being payment of
68. In particular, this offset arrangement was used to facilitate the siting of a GM auto
assembly plant in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and a Volkswagen plant in New Stanton, Penn-
sylvania. Both these cities are in nonattainment areas for ozone. Assembly plants are major
hydrocarbon sources because of paint spraying operations. See 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 220
(1977).
69. 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1351-52 (1978).
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Comments of the Natural Resources Defense Council on Virginia's Pro-
posed State Implementation Plan Revisions 1-6 (detailing deficiencies of the refinery offsets).
[Vol. 21
COASTAL ENERGY SITING DILEMMAS
damages to the fishermen and recreation interests harmed by the in-
stallation. For a number of reasons, however, damages are not likely
to be a satisfactory solution. Valuation would be quite difficult;
many interests, such as those of endangered species, would go unrep-
resented. A second form of tradeoff might be more feasible: the re-
finery or other installation might make some other environmental
improvement such as creation of a wildlife refuge or marine sanctu-
ary, or operation of a fish hatchery.
It may be objected that "environmental improvement" is a contra-
diction in terms, natural systems are best left undisturbed, and a re-
finery should not be permitted to destroy one natural system by
"saving" another one which should have been left alone anyway. The
practical counterpart of this objection is that the refinery might get
off easily by "protecting" an area so remote or undesirable from a
commercial standpoint it was never in danger of development. This
kind of improvement would be of no tangible benefit to the coastal
interests threatened by the installation, and little help in mollifying
them. Therefore any wilderness, sanctuary, or hatchery protected in
a tradeoff would have to be reasonably close to the area threatened
by the energy installation.
Thus the tradeoff principle may be workable in resolving siting dis-
putes in rural coastal communities as well as in more urban areas.
Can this principle also work to resolve siting problems involving
threats to entire animal species, and danger to human life?
The tradeoff principle might work in the wildlife situation if the
installation threatens animals from a widely scattered but endangered
species, as may be the case of the Eastport refinery's threats to bald
eagles and whales. Some form of offset may be possible there, such
as taking additional protective measures for the species in other areas.
However, in the case of a menace to most of a particular species, en-
dangered or not, as in the case of the Portsmouth refinery's threat to
the entire blue crab population of the Chesapeake Bay,7 2 it is unclear
whether any offset is possible once risks have been reduced as much
as possible. In the latter case, the only solution may be to abandon
both the site and the tradeoff principle, and to build the installation
somewhere else. 7 3
The endangered species problems simply may be impossible to
72. See 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1647 (1979).
73. One possible mitigation measure would be to restrict oil deliveries and shipments
sharply during January and February, the time of greatest vulnerability. Refinery mainte-
nance might be performed then; operations might be curtailed; oil might be shipped in and
out by pipeline or drawn from extra storage capacity. Some of these solutions present air
quality problems.
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solve with the tradeoff principle, especially if there is a relatively
large number of endangered species, each concentrated in a small
geographic (coastal) area. In that case offset might be impossible.
There is, however, an administrative mechanism provided in the En-
dangered Species Act Amendments of 1978," which would permit
endangered species obstacles to be overridden once "reasonable miti-
gation and enhancement measures" were taken.7 The mechanics of
this process are now entangled in litigation over the Eastport refinery,
which has sought an exemption from the act. 6
Conceptually, the evaluation of human safety risks on a tradeoff
basis may be much easier, since the tradeoff simply may be between
safety risks and liability insurance costs. Insurance requirements for
liquid natural gas (LNG) and liquid propane gas (LPG) terminals
feasibly may be used to make safety tradeoffs needed to site these
terminals. If terminal operators were required to obtain sufficient
insurance coverage to pay the damages caused by the worst-case acci-
dent-terminal detonation-then terminals would probably not be
located in heavily populated areas like Staten Island and Boston,
both the sites of controversial facilities.7 Imposition of this kind of
insurance requirement might mean that no terminals would be built
at all because of the difficulty of obtaining insurance for an accident
of that magnitude, no matter how remote the chance. A sensible
alternative would be imposition of substantive safety standards and
of a governmentally administered liability fund supported by a con-
veyancing tax on the industry. In that situation, terminals like the
one at Cove Point, Maryland, would be built-installations removed
from population centers, buffered by a substantial land area, and
built to strict safety standards.7 8 Congress may soon require that
74. Pub. L. No. 95-362, 92 Stat. 3751 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § § 1532-1542 (Supp. Il
1979)).
75. Id., § 3(h)(1)(B) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1979)). These
measures include but are not limited to "live propagation, transplantation, and habitat
acquisition and improvement, as are necessary and appropriate to minimize the adverse
effects of the agency action upon the endangered species, threatened species, or critical
habitat concerned." Id. The Endangered Species Committee must also find on the record
that
(1) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action;
(2) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of alternative
courses of action consistent with conserving the species or its critical habitat,
and such action is in the public interest; and
(3) the action is of regional or national significance.
Id., § 3(h)(1)(A) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1979)).
76. See 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 658, 786 (1979) (discussion of filed litigation).
77. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMD 78-28, 1 REPORT TO CONGRESS:
LIQUIFIED ENERGY GASES SAFETY (1978) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT].
78. See 3 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 911 (1972) (discussing terms of consent agreement be-
tween the Sierra Club and the gas company in litigation over the terminal).
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safety standards for terminals be set.7  The imposition of liability
insurance requirements would help assure that proper tradeoffs were
made in siting.
The sort of flexible balancing needed to make the tradeoffs re-
quired for siting is precisely the kind of consideration NEPA imposes
upon federal agencies.' I Yet while case law recognizes that agencies
have an independent duty to reject permit applications for projects
whose environmental costs clearly outweigh overall benefits,1 I such
case law has not adequately addressed the intermediate case, where
the damage is severe, but not so great as to require permit rejection.8 2
Agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency have imposed
the mitigation measures indicated in the Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) by means of the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit and other permits, writing into the permit
mitigation measures covering all kinds of environmental damage, and
so making them legally enforceable. 8 1 This approach does not clarify
the extent to which various permits, such as Corps of Engineers'
dredge-fill permits, can be used as the vehicle for those require-
ments.84 Although the authority to impose mitigation measures
would seem necessarily implicit where there is authority to deny the
permit altogether,8 s no court has ruled on the issue, and the Council
on Environmental Quality (CEO) has not made its policy clear in the
EIS regulations.86 The adoption of such regulations would help ex-
79. See Pipeline Safety Act of 1979, § § 151-156, Pub. L. No. 96-129, 93 Stat. 998 (to
be codified at 49 U.S.C. § § 1671, 1674a, 1674b, 1679a, 1682) (safety standards for marine
LNG terminals).
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
81. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 300 (8th
Ci. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cit. 1971)
(discussing balancing requirement).
82. See Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
83. Although hundreds of cases have been litigated under NEPA, few explicitly consider
mitigation measures. See, e.g., Public Service Co. of N.H. v. N.R.C., 582 F.2d 77 (1st Cir.
1978). Cases that do, limit required mitigation measures to those within the agency's author-
ity. Id.
84. The EPA so used a permit in the case of the Eastport refinery. See 9 ENVIR. REP.
(BNA) 371, 704 (1978) (discussing many permit conditions, including certain measures to
prevent and contain oil spills, and even to begin vocational training for local residents).
The practice of writing mitigation measures into permits is common, but it is not ex-
plicitly authorized by the statutory sections governing permits. See, e.g., Clean Water Act
§ 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
85. See Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. III 1979) (limited grounds for
denying dredge-fill permits).
86. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(4) (1978). This regulation details the required EIS dis-
cussion of alternatives, which implicitly include mitigation measures. Id. The regulations are
silent concerning how mitigation measures should be imposed and enforced. See Note, Im-
plementation of the Environmental Impact Statement, 88 YALE L.J. 593 (1979) (discussing
approach for substantive implementation of mitigation measures).
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pedite siting by avoiding the problem of requiring agencies simply to
approve or disapprove projects without a chance to modify pro-
posals. ' '
Thus, the tradeoff approach may accommodate coastal residents'
and environmentalists' interests in the proper siting of energy instal-
lations, and NEPA could be interpreted to require such tradeoffs.
III. PREEMPTION PROBLEMS
An important element in the energy problems of the United States
has been its inability to provide modern coastal facilities either to re-
ceive the large quantities of foreign and Alaskan oil and gas now used
by Americans or to refine imported crude oil into the low-sulfur oil
and unleaded gasoline needed to comply with air pollution standards.
These facilities were not built in the 1960s because of the oil import
quota program which restrained oil imports. 88 They were not built
in the 1970s because of environmental restrictions and federal oil
pricing regulations. Failure to construct these facilities over the past
twenty years is now perceived as a crisis and a justification for the
Energy Mobilization Board.
Although the FCZMA in theory should control coastal energy
siting disputes, it has proven largely irrelevant. Those disputes which
have come closest to resolution allowing construction of the disputed
facility have done so using tradeoff principles in other statutes.
Two lessons must be learned from experience with the present sta-
tutory scheme, however, before either the tradeoff principle or the
Energy Mobilization Board will be more than polite names for the
application of brute political force. The first lesson is this: the unco-
ordinated presence of several federal agencies with exclusive regula-
tory jurisdiction over some component of a coastal energy project
makes principled tradeoffs, and thus project approval, almost impos-
sible. This is especially true where LNG and LPG terminals are con-
cerned.
The second lesson is this: unless fragmented state and federal envi-
ronmental permitting procedures are consolidated into a coherent
system, decisionmaking regarding siting will remain an agonizingly
slow and expensive process. Present permitting procedures foster re-
litigation or evasion of issues and do not help officials make intelli-
gent siting decisions.
An analysis of proposals to build a liquid propane gas terminal and
a small oil refinery at Morehead City, North Carolina, a small coastal
87. See text accompanying notes 93-119 infra.
88. See notes 12, 31, and 36 and accompanying text supra.
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port, will illustrate these problems of federal exclusivity and frag-
mented permitting procedures. Morehead City is heavily dependent
on tourism and fishing, and so resembles other small coastal commu-
nities like Machiasport and Hilton Head. North Carolina has a fully
approved (and well-regarded) program under the FCZMA and has
been delegated almost full permitting authority under the Clean Air
and Clean Water Acts. Consideration of these siting proposals and the
problems they are likely to encounter will show the limitations of the
present federal statutory scheme for siting such installations, and the
restraints on state attempts to resolve these difficulties.
LPG Terminal Siting: The Pitfalls of Federal Exclusivity
Early in March, 1978, North Carolina Governor James P. Hunt an-
nounced that Gulf Interstate, Inc., a Houston firm, proposed to con-
struct a large LPG terminal on Radio Island in Morehead City har-
bor.8 9 The terminal, he said, would be "a great addition to North
Carolina's energy resources," allowing the importation of large quan-
tities of Algerian propane to serve the North Carolina market. 9 0
Local residents who learned about the record of explosions and fatal-
ities associated with LPG transportation and storage 9 argued that
89. Propane Company Office Goes Up: Firm Invests Without Permits, Carteret County
News-Times, Aug. 21, 1978, at 1, col. I (giving background).
90. Id.
91. Spills of LPG are very dangerous, probably more so than a similar spill of LNG. Like
an LNG spill, LPG will spread as a ground-hugging vapor cloud. Unlike LNG, LPG is heavier
than air; it ignites at a lower temperature than LNG, and at lower concentrations; and it has
a higher heat content. I GAO REPORT, supra note 77, at 2-4. A most disturbing propensity
of an LPG spill is its tendency to explode spontaneously in the open air (even sitting over
water), and to do so with tremendous explosive force resulting in a huge fireball. An LNG
spill would probably not so explode. Id. at 13-2 to 13-3. There have been spectacular dis-
asters associated with every phase of LPG and LNG shipment: tanker, terminal, railroad car.
and truck. Most of the disasters involved LPG. In 1974, 30 people were killed in a Tokyo
Bay collision between the freighter Pacific Ares and the LPG/naphtha tanker Yuyo Maru 10.
The tanker exploded and burned for three weeks, until it was towed to sea, still afire, and
sunk by naval gunfire and torpedoes. LPG aggravated a fire attributed to naphtha. Id. A
Cleveland LNG terminal, less than one-tenth the size of the LPG terminal proposed for
Morehead City. failed spectacularly in 1944, causing explosions and fires that killed 128
people. Id. at 10-2.
Transshipment of LPG by railroad tank car is probably the most dangerous aspect of the
terminal proposed for Morehead City. Between 1973 and early 1978, when the terminal was
proposed, there were four major LPG tank car accidents in the U.S. killing 34 people and
injuring more than 450 others. Id. at 18, 19; HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOR-
EIGN COMMERCE, FUELS TRANSPORTATION SAFETY ACT OF 1978, H.R. REP. NO.
1167, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1978). There have been several railroad accidents since
then involving LPG, including the 1979 evacuation of a quarter of a million people from
Missaugua, Ontario, for fear that burning LPG tank cars would rupture tanks of chlorine
gas and endanger the town. In addition to the tank car accidents, there have been at least
three severe LPG truck accidents since 1975 involving explosion of LPG. These accidents
killed 24 people and injured 45. 1 GAO REPORT, supra note 77, at 8-5. Moreover, two LPG
truck accidents in Spain and Mexico in 1978 killed more than 190 and injured several hun-
dred more. Edward Markey, Boston Globe, July 24, 1978.
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the terminal would be a great danger to life and property, and should
not be built.9 2 After construction of an office building on the site,
opposition became sufficiently intense that work was stopped.
Should work resume on the terminal in the future and Gulf Inter-
state seek the necessary governmental approvals, the company and its
opponents would find that regulatory authority has been divided be-
tween the state's Coastal Resources Commission (CRC), which ad-
ministers the state's federally approved coastal zone management
program, and several federal agencies with exclusive jurisdiction over
some aspect of the design, operation, and safety of the terminal.
The division of regulatory authority in this fashion increases the
chances not only that a project might be disapproved, but that if it is
built, it may be built to inadequate standards. This worst-of-both
worlds situation is traceable largely to Congress' failure to reconcile
the exclusive federal regulatory jurisdiction over many elements of
coastal energy development with the veto power over federal permits
given the states under the FCZMA.9 I In the case of the LPG termi-
nal, this would leave state officials the unpalatable choice of allowing
the terminal to be built to concededly inadequate federal safety stan-
dards9 or disapproving it entirely. The statutory scheme would
leave little room for tradeoffs and political compromise, the essence
of any workable permitting system. 9 5
Division of authority in this fashion has other unfortunate effects:
inadequate federal safety standards may preempt, or at least hinder,
state attempts to issue more adequate ones, and jurisdictional dis-
putes among federal regulatory agencies could slow federal attempts
to improve inadequate standards.
Each feature of the Gulf Interstate LPG terminal proposal would
be subject to exclusive federal safety regulation. In theory, the design
and operations of LPG tankers would be regulated by the Coast
92. Carteret County News-Times, Aug. 28, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1976) (veto).
94. Present codes and standards, including the National Fire Protection Association
NFPA Standard 58 used by North Carolina, are more stringent than those used at Cleveland,
but they still are designed to handle only the same limited leakage. 1 GAO REPORT, supra
note 77, at 16-1 to 16-5. The only regulation governing the marine LPG terminal's opera-
tions at the time the terminal was proposed, 33 C.F.R. § 126.15(o) (1978), set relatively
general requirements for liquid cargo transfer systems. A general permit for all facilities han-
dling LPG (and other listed substances) has already been issued, conditioned on the obser-
vance of these safety requirements. 33 C.F.R. § 126.27 (1978). The Coast Guard concedes
that this regulation is not adequate to assure safe handling of LPG and is developing a more
specific regulation. Telephone interview with Capt. Dan Charter, Chief, Port Safety and Law
Enforcement Division, U.S.C.G.H.Q., Washington, D.C. (Dec. 12, 1978).
95. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON WATER QUALITY, STAFF DRAFT REPORT
at V-30 (1975) (water pollution control permitting a process of bargaining) [hereinafter
cited as NCWQ Draft].
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Guard;9 6 the design and operation of LPG tank cars would be regu-
lated by the Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB) and the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) (both agencies of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation);7 and the design and operation of the LPG
terminal facility would be regulated by both the Coast Guard and the
MTB.9 I At the time the LPG dispute came to a head in October,
1978, the Coast Guard regulated the operations of LPG tankers, 9 9
96. The Coast Guard has authority over vessel design and operations, and terminal de-
sign and operations under the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-474, 92
Stat. 1471 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1221-1232, 46 U.S.C. § § 214, 391a (Supp. 11 1978 &
Supp. II1 1979)), which extensively amended the Port and Waterways Safety Act of 1972.
Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424, and the Coast Guard's earlier authority over tankers. Act
of June 23, 1936, ch. 729, 49 Stat. 1889, as amended.
In addition, the Coast Guard has authority under § 1 of the Espionage Act and § 1 of
the Magnuson Act, 50 U.S.C. § 191 (1976), to regulate vessel anchorage in order to prevent
sabotage. This latter authority has been used to establish safety zones around vessels.
97. The Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB) has the authority to set design stan-
dards for terminals and railroad cars under the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. § § 1-43
(1976 & Supp. I1 1978), and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § § 1801-
1812 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978). The Federal Railroad Administration enforces these as well as
certain operational standards for railroads. Most LNG and LPG terminals are connected to
pipelines and regulated under the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968,49 U.S.C. § § 1671-
1684 (1976), which Congress recently amended to tighten standards for these terminals. See
Pipeline Safety Act of 1979, § § 151-156, Pub. L. No. 96-129, 93 Stat. 998 (to be codified
at 49 U.S.C. § § 1671, 1674a, 1674b, 1679a, 1682). The Morehead City terminal would not
be subject to these standards because its product would be shipped inland by rail.
98. See notes 96 and 97 supra.
99. The Coast Guard had promulgated regulations governing the design of U.S. flag LPG
vessels, 46 C.F.R. § 38 (1977), and certification of the cargo containment portion of for-
eign flag LPG vessels under the letter of compliance (LOC) program. 46 C.F.R. § 154
(1976). The vessel owner must request LOC certification from the Coast Guard at least 90
days before the vessel is due to enter its first U.S. port. The Coast Guard reviews the design,
issues an LOC with appropriate instructions, and inspects the vessel when it enters the port.
Id.
Required operational precautions for an LPG ship entering Beaufort Inlet (Morehead
City Harbor) would be likely to include (1) Coast Guard boarding and inspection of the
vessel before it entered port; (2) escort vessels; and (3) establishment of safety or security
zones around the ship which no unauthorized vessel could enter. These precautions would
be decided by the Coast Guard Captain of the Port of Wilmington, North Carolina, who has
jurisdiction over Morehead City. 33 C.F.R. § 3.25-20 (1977). This official has ample author-
ity to order establishment of a security zone, 33 C.F.R. § § 6, 127 (1978), under § 1 of the
Espionage Act and § 1 of the Magnuson Act, 50 U.S.C. § 191 (1976), and safety zones
under the Port and Waterway Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. § § 1221-1232, 46 U.S.C. § 391a
(Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III 1979); see also 33 C.F.R. § 165 (1978). Safety zones differ in
that they may be declared for marine environmental protection purposes as well as for the
prevention of accidents and sabotage, and may be enforced by civil penalties. 42 Fed. Reg.
63368 (1977).
Operationally, these zones are likely to have the same sort of disruptive impact on the
livelihoods of fishermen and charter boat operators, and it was the likely establishment of
these zones which aroused much citizen opposition. See Researcher Warns Propane Terminal
Could Be Time Bomb, Carteret County News-Times, Aug. 24, 1978, at 2A. Since these zones
are declared by the Captain of the Port, on short notice, and since these orders are exempt
from notice-and-comment rulemaking under the appropriate Administrative Procedure Act
provision, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1976), there is little opportunity for the public to com-
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the MTB regulated the design of LPG railroad tank cars,' 0 0 and both
agencies were fighting over jurisdiction to regulate marine LPG ter-
minal design and operations.' 0 ' With the exception of an inadequate
and general Coast Guard regulation concerning the safety of unload-
ing operations,' 0 2 no federal regulation governed the design and op-
eration of the LPG terminal itself. Since no permits were required,
there would be no public hearings, no notice-and-comment rule-
making, no EIS, no judicial review, and most importantly, little fed-
eral scrutiny of the terminal design and operations beyond what was
required of the Corps' EIS.
Had Gulf Interstate applied to the state Coastal Resources Com-
mission (CRC) for a permit under these circumstances, the CRC might
well have considered the imposition of more stringent safety stan-
dards on the tankers, terminal, and on rail design and operations. The
legal tests for deciding whether a state regulatory standard is pre-
empted under the supremacy and commerce clauses can be seen in
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co.I 0 The Court struck down the State of Washington's attempts
to bar large supertankers from Puget Sound and to impose design and
equipment standards on smaller ones, 0 I 4 but upheld state attempts
to impose certain operation requirements on the ships.' 0' Congress
must intend to override state standards for the Court to find preemp-
tion under the supremacy clause, and that intention may be inferred
from any of three factors: whether the federal regulatory scheme is
ment on the general practice of establishing these zones. The only public opportunity for
comment would be to request that safety zones be established or to comment on the Corps
of Engineers dredge-fill ElSes associated with the terminal's construction.
100. All LPG tank cars built after 1977 must have special safety devices which probably
would have prevented most of the previous major LPG tank car accidents. 49 C.F.R. § 179.
105 (1977) (justifying regulation). Existing LPG tank cars must be retrofitted with these de-
vices by the end of 1980; this target date is two years earlier than the date initially proposed
because the MTB accelerated the schedule after 15 people were killed in a railroad tank car
explosion in Waverly, Tennessee. Id.; 43 Fed. Reg. 20250 (May 11, 1978).
Although these and other regulations enforced by the Federal Railroad Administration
cover a bewildering array of safety issues under a variety of statutes, these "railroad safety
regulations extend only to personnel and handling procedures at the transfer point, and not
the design of the transfer system itself between the storage facility and the connecting mode
of transportation." 2 GAO REPORT, supra note 77, App. XVI-3, at 91.
101. The Coast Guard and the MTB spent three years resolving jurisdictional disputes
over marine LNG terminals. See 2 GAO REPORT, supra note 77, App. XVI-3, at 85 (mem-
orandum of understanding). Although a memorandum of understanding concerning marine
LPG terminals was signed in March 1979, it does not cover railroad as opposed to pipeline
terminals.
102. See note 94, supra.
103. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
104. Id. at 166-68 (design standards), 173-78 (tonnage limitations).
105. Id. at 168-73 (tug escort).
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pervasive, whether the federal interest in the subject is dominant, and
whether implementation of the state standard will interfere with fed-
eral standards designed to achieve the same objectives.1 0 6 If the sub-
ject matter of the state regulation is one requiring a uniform national
rule, Congress need not have acted for the state standard to be pre-
empted under the commerce clause.' 0 7
The Ray decision would control any attempt by North Carolina to
regulate LPG tanker traffic into Beaufort Inlet, both because of the
similarities in facts and because the Coast Guard would be regulating
this traffic under authority of the same statutes as those involved in
Ray. 1 0 8 Under Ray, the state could not close Beaufort Inlet to LPG
tankers or impose design and equipment standards. 0 9 North Caro-
lina probably could not impose operational requirements either, for
the Coast Guard regulates LPG tanker operation in the most minute
detail. Indeed, the imposition of safety zones around LPG tankers
under Coast Guard regulations raised much of the opposition to the
LPG terminal, for the zones would likely interfere with the opera-
tions of other vessels in the harbor and inlet.1 1 0 Under Coast Guard
regulations there is no opportunity for persons affected by LPG
tanker operations to comment on or oppose them.' ' I Thus, there
would be very little that the state or local residents could do about
these tanker operations.
Gulf Interstate's proposal would have involved shipment of up to
9000 railroad tank cars per year of LPG through Morehead City.
Judging by recent casualty figures on LPG transportation, this may
be the most hazardous aspect of the proposed terminal, and the state
might well consider regulating it.1  2 Given the long history of fed-
106. Id. at 157-58.
107. Id. at 179.
108. Port and Waterways SafetyAct of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § § 1221-1232,46 U.S.C. § 391a
(Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. 11I 1979) as amended by Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471.
109. Ironically enough, the states do have the authority to regulate air pollution emis-
sions from tankers and barges. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440
(1960); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 316-17 (5th Cir. 1974) (hydrocarbon emissions from
tank barges). The rationale for allowing states to regulate air pollution from ships, but not
ship safety, is that safety is subject to an extensive body of federal rules, and uniform rules
are necessary in the safety field, while no such extensive, uniform federal rules have been
issued for air pollution from ships. See EPA Memorandum, reprinted in 123 CONG. REC.
18507 (1977).
110. See note 99 supra.
111. See note 99 supra. Local residents may request the imposition of safety or security
zones, 33 C.F.R. § § 127.20, 165.15 (1978), but since these zones would interfere with
fishing and boating, local residents are likely to be reluctant to do so.
112. This estimate of rail traffic is based on the Chesapeake, Virginia LPG terminal,
which has almost exactly the same storage capacity as the Morehead City terminal, and
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eral railroad safety regulation, however, there might be precious little
the state would be permitted to regulate. The design and safety equip-
ment of railroad rolling stock has long been subject to exclusive fed-
eral regulation under the Safety Appliance Act and now under the
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act.' ' Fortunately, safety stan-
dards for LPG tank car designs and safety equipment have been pro-
mulgated, and these standards require refitting of existing LPG tank
cars with the requisite safety improvements.' ', Although the state
may, in the absence of federal regulatory action on the subject, im-
pose operational requirements like speed limits on the LPG trains,' I I
these requirements may not impose an excessive burden on interstate
commerce. State attempts to limit train length or control the number
of LPG tank cars to be sent in a train might be barred by the com-
merce clause, even in the absence of federal regulatory action on the
matter.' 1 6 Thus there might be little that state or local authorities
could do besides order more frequent track inspection or low speed
limits.
Both the Coast Guard and the MTB have statutory authority to
regulate the design and operation of marine LPG terminals, but with
the exception of a general regulation governing the safety of liquid
cargo bulk transfer systems (ship-to-shore), no standards have been
issued.' ' " This inaction is traceable to a long jurisdictional battle be-
tween these agencies, to conceptual problems with initial Coast Guard
proposals in this area,' I I and to bureaucratic inertia.
This regulatory morass will present obstacles to any CRC attempt
to regulate the design and operations of the terminal. Any state at-
which can handle up to a million cubic meters per year. North Carolina demand is almost a
million cubic meters a year, much of it from farmers using LPG for crop drying and curing.
See 2 GAO REPORT, supra note 77, App. XIV-1, at 6, 12, 19. The estimate of tank car
movement is generated by dividing these figures by the capacity of the average LPG tank
car, approximately 115 cubic meters. These tank cars would be dispatched for three miles
down a rail line which runs between the lanes of Arrendel Street, Morehead City's main
road. This places most of the town's residents within a few blocks of the shipments. See
notes 91 supra (giving casualty figures).
113. See Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Pub. Service Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566 (1919) (interpre-
ting Safety Appliance Act and federal regulations to preempt state safety equipment stan-
dards); Conrail v. City of Dover, 450 F. Supp. 966, 973-74 (D. Del. 1978) (interpreting
Hazardous Material Transportation Act regulations to preempt city hazardous materials
transportation ordinances).
114. See note 100 supra.
115. See Erb v. Morasch, 177 U.S. 584 (1900) (city speed limits not preempted in ab-
sence of federal regulation).
116. See Southern P. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (commerce clause preemp-
tion of state train length regulation).
117. Telephone interview with Capt. Dan Charter, Chief, Port Safety and Law Enforce-
ment Division, U.S.C.G.H.Q., Washington, D.C. (Dec. 12, 1978).
118. Id.
[Vol. 21
COASTAL ENERGY SITING DILEMMAS
tempt to impose design standards will have to contend with partial
preemption by Coast Guard regulations for tankers and MTB regula-
tions for railroads, and with practical conflicts between possible state
regulations and Coast Guard regulations concerning terminal design
and operations. However, the practical difficulties of developing state
standards in the context of a permit proceeding may still lead to un-
workable or inadequate state standards. Thus the easiest course for
the CRC might be to reject the permit application until the federal
government managed to develop acceptable standards.
Preemption might be more of a problem on the operational side,
given the Coast Guard's propensity to regulate by means of orders
issued by the Captain of the Port, orders not generally subject to the
procedural niceties of the APA or NEPA.' 1 ' Here, exercised federal
authority may preempt any state regulatory efforts, but may do so
in a fashion which prevents the CRC from satisfying itself in advance
that operational safeguards will be adequate. Although the authority
to make quick regulatory decisions is essential to deal with potential
emergencies, the failure to issue operational standards as federal rules
would make it difficult for the CRC to assure local residents' safety,
and provide another reason to reject the terminal.
Thus, because of the fragmentation of regulatory authority be-
tween state and federal agencies, and because of the preemptive effect
of federal standards, there may be little the CRC can do besides re-
jecting the terminal, in the way of independently assuring the safety
of local residents.
IV. FRAGMENTED PERMIT PROCEEDINGS
Exclusivity is related to a second problem of equal importance:
the fragmentation of state and federal environmental permitting pro-
cedures and appeals. Fragmentation promotes needless relitigation of
some issues. It also encourages the evasion of other issues, especially
the most important: whether, considering the dangers and benefits, a
particular installation ought to be built at a particular site.
Consideration of a second recent siting dispute at Morehead City,
involving a small oil refinery, illustrates this fragmentation and shows
limitations on the ability of states to remedy the problem. The chief
restraint is Congress' failure to devise a rational system for the appel-
late review of permit decisions.
On July 20, 1978, Carolina Refining and Distributing Company
applied for a prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) air quality
permit to construct a 30,000 barrel/day refinery across the Newport
119. Id.
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River estuary from Morehead City.' 2 0 The company filed its appli-
cation just two weeks before the Clean Air Act's more stringent mon-
itoring requirements became effective.1 2' After a hotly disputed
public hearing in June 1979, the state ordered the company to con-
duct four months of ozone monitoring, something the company has
so far refused to do, despite the apparent application of the Clean Air
Act's full PSD requirements because of their continued delay .' 22
The company has applied for other permits as well, including, pre-
sumably, a water pollution discharge permit, coastal zone develop-
ment permit, dredge-fill permit, and a state refinery siting permit., 2 3
An EIS is being prepared for the Corps of Engineers to use in de-
ciding whether to issue a dredge-fill permit.' 24 The dispute on the
ozone monitoring has delayed the EIS and other permits.' 2 5
So far, the refinery dispute has followed the pattern seen in other
small coastal communities, with local residents who are heavily de-
pendent on fishing and tourism strongly opposing the refinery, and
with development interests in and out of state government supporting
it.' 2 6 The political situation is complicated by an application by
Crown Petroleum to build a much larger refinery at Wilmington,
North Carolina. ' 2 7
Several elements of this dispute are worth noting for what they
show about coastal energy siting in general and states' power to im-
120. N.C. Dept. of Natural Resources and Community Development, Division of Envi-
ronmental Management, Hearing Report, Conclusions, Discussion and Recommendations
Concerning PSD Permit for Carolina Refining and Distributing Company, Inc., for Refinery
Proposed near Morehead City, Carteret County, N.C., at 1 (August 21, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Hearing Record].
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(e)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
122. The Clean Air Act commands that completed permit applications "shall be granted
or denied not later than one year after the date of filing of such completed application." 42
U.S.C. § 7475(c) (Supp. 11 1978). Carolina Refining's application was completed July 20,
1978, Hearing Record, supra note 120, at Conclusions, 2, but the company's adamant re-
fusal to conduct ozone monitoring has led to a delay until at least September, 1981, more
than two years past the time that the monitoring was ordered and that the statute required
a decision. The state ordered four months of ozone monitoring in order to determine if the
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for ozone, 40 C.F.R. § 50.9 (1979),
would be violated. The company's deliberate delay means that the application is no longer
exempt from the monitoring requirements of the PSD provisions, and must be denied.
123. An NPDES permit is required under the Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342
(1976 & Supp. III 1979), and a dredge-fill permit under § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. III
1979). The coastal zone development permit is required under the state's Coastal Area Man-
agement Act (CAMA), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-118 (1978) (major development permit for
energy installations), and the refinery siting statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.101 (1978).
124. Hearing Record, supra note 120, at Conclusions, 14.
125. The environmental impact statement must address the air quality issues and incor-
porate the air quality monitoring data. Id.; Clean Air Act § 309, 42 U.S.C. § 7609 (Supp. II
1978) (EIS coordination).
126. Hearing Record, supra note 120, at Conclusions, $ 14.
127. See 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1751 (1979) (Wilmington refinery proposal).
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prove it. There are two positive aspects. First of all, North Carolina
has been delegated authority over NPDES and PSD permits under the
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.' 2 8 These statutes permit, explicitly
or implicitly, the "case-by-case" tightening of control technology re-
quirements,' 2 9 thus authorizing state officials working with coastal
residents to seek compromise solutions allowing standards more
stringent than federal minimums.
The second positive aspect shown by this dispute is the require-
ment under North Carolina law that state officials make an overall
cost-benefit analysis of a facility in order to decide if a refinery siting
permit should issue.' 3 0 This statute, like the state's environmental
laws and Coastal Area Management Act, is administered by the De-
partment of Natural Resources and Community Development
(DNRCD). Under recently adopted regulations the department must
not only assure compliance with air and water pollution require-
ments; it also must assure the prevention of substantial adverse
effects upon marine fisheries, wildlife, and parkland.1 3  Perhaps most
important, the statute and regulations authorize the department to
impose special permit requirements to prevent or mitigate adverse
effects.1 3 2 The department has explicit authority to compromise,
using the tradeoff principle in solving these siting disputes.
Thus the North Carolina approach helps make a principled tradeoff
policy a real possibility. Officials have the authority to tighten stan-
dards in order to help work out compromise solutions. Moreover,
state officials must make a considered public decision on the overall
merits of the refinery. (This state approach also helps overcome a
problem under NEPA, namely how to make mitigation measures en-
forceable.)1 3 3
At the administrative level, delay and relitigation of issues will be
reduced. Although major permit issues will have to be considered
three times-once in the permit decision, once in the EIS, and once in
128. 40 C.F.R. § 52.1770(16), (17) (1978) (air act delegation for portions of PSD per-
mitting); 40 Fed. Reg. 51493 (1975) (NPDES delegation).
129. The Clean Air Act's PSD provisions mandate the case-by-case tightening of the best
available control technology requirement by the permitting authorities. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(4)
(Supp. 11 1978). For discussion of the bargaining which occurs on NPDES permits, see note
94 supra.
130. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.101 (1978); 15 N.C. ADMIN. CODE IF (Oil Re-
fining Facility Permit Regulations) (1980).
131. 15 N.C. ADMIN. CODE IF.0006(d) (1980).
132. 15 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 1F.006(e)(2) (1980).
133. Under present NEPA case law there is an independent duty on the part of federal
officials to deny permits where the EIS indicates unacceptable damage despite compliance
with statutory air or water pollution control requirements. See Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm.,
Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Under present law it is unclear whether
federal officials must or may impose substantive mitigation measures under NEPA.
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the refinery siting permit decision-as a practical matter, the informa-
tion generated in the permit proceedings will be incorporated into the
EIS, and the EIS data into the record of the refinery siting decision.
The refinery siting decision may help organize the other permit pro-
ceedings into a more coherent system, and encourage opponents to
make the overall case against the refinery in the siting decision and
not in each permit proceeding.
On the federal level, EPA's proposed consolidation of permit pro-
cesses might prove a strong encouragement to the states to adopt
some form of general siting statute like Maine's, or like North Caro-
lina's refinery statute.' I This important consolidation not only will
help force an official decision on the overall merits of the project,
but also will allow the consolidation of appellate review into a single
action. As discussed above,' I ' the possibility of interminable appel-
late litigation over state and federal permits was a key factor in the
demise of the SOHIO pipeline proposed in Long Beach, California.
The fragmentation of potential appellate proceedings is more pro-
nounced than fragmentation at the administrative level. Consideration
of the possible appeals in the Carolina Refining case will illustrate this
appellate confusion rather well. If environmentalists were to contest
the issuance of a PSD permit because of the company's and state's
failure to comply with appropriate monitoring requirements, at least
two and as many as five different procedural routes would be open
to them. They could sue in state trial court to enjoin the Secretary of
the Department of Natural Resources and Community Development
from issuing the permit. In addition, they could seek review of the
state decision and EPA's approval of it in both the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, and in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.' 3 6
Filings in state and federal court, however, raise the possibility that
the federal court might abstain, staying the action until a final deci-
sion by the state court on related issues of state law.' I ' The resultant
delay could be substantial, prejudicing all parties to the dispute.' ' 8
134. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § § 481-488 (1978 & Supp. 1980-81); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-215.101 (1978).
135. See notes 59-68 and accompanying text supra.
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(3) (Supp. 111978) (district court jurisdiction over citizen
suit over PSD); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1978) (Court of Appeals jurisdiction over
challenges to state implementation plan revisions).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Interlake, 429 F. Supp. 193, 198 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (absten-
tion pending state clarification of emission limitation).
138. "One of the principal costs of abstention is the prolonged delay it often brings in
its wake." P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHS-
LER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 994 (2d ed. 1973). See,
e.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 418 (1964) (noting
many years' delay).
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Several other federal courts might have jurisdiction as well. Because
EPA has not fully delegated PSD permit authority to the state, its
reservation of final authority raises the possibility that either the re-
finer or local residents opposed to the installation might sue EPA's re-
gional administrator for Region IV in Atlanta, or the EPA administra-
tor in Washington, D.C., in order to force EPA to issue or deny the
permit. Thus plaintiffs might file suit in the federal district courts for
the District of Columbia and for the Northern District of Georgia,
seeking injunctive relief and relief in the nature of mandamus.' "
Courts have split over whether such jurisdiction is available under the
Clean Air Act, but at least some authority indicates that such actions
will lie in district court. 4o If these actions were permitted, absten-
tion might be a problem here as well. The bottom line of all these
combinations is delay and expense to all parties.
The situation regarding the NPDES permit may be just as bad, since
jurisdiction to review any state decision on the permit will lie not
only in state court, but in the federal district court and in the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals as an original action.1 4 1 An artful pleader
for either side might frame the action to give other courts jurisdiction
as well. To complicate things further, it should be noted that chal-
lenges to the air and water permits would proceed as separate actions
since there is no guarantee that the administrative decisions on these
permits would be simultaneous.
A challenge to the EIS would lie in the federal district courts both
for the eastern district of North Carolina and for the District of Co-
lumbia. To complicate any NEPA challenge is the possibility that a
decision by the state court under the refinery siting statute, which re-
quires much the same sort of balancing as NEPA, might collaterally
estop some of the issues.' 1 2 A NEPA decision might also be viewed
139. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 448 F. Supp. 89 (D.D.C. 1978)
(by implication, district court mandamus jurisdiction extends to nondiscretionary actions of
local applicability); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(3) (Supp. 111978) (district court re-
view of PSD permits under citizen suit provision).
140. See note 139 supra.
141. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Va.
1978).
142. Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, makes issues of fact decided
against a party in an earlier proceeding binding against that party in a later action involving
substantially the same incident or transaction. Issues of fact which will be given this effect
must have been actually litigated and necessary to support the judgment in the first action.
Collateral estoppel need not be mutual, i.e., once an issue is decided against a party, that
party may not relitigate that issue in an action against a third party. See Bonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (abolishing
mutuality); Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d
892 (Cal. 1942) (leading state case abolishing mutuality requirement; now followed in a
majority of states).
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as collateral estoppel by the state court in a challenge under the re-
finery siting statute.
The possibilities for challenging other permits in court, for ex-
ample the coastal zone permit,' 43 are just as numerous and intricate.
The present system for appellate review of these environmental per-
mit decisions adds a great deal of complexity, delay, confusion, and
expense, little of which is necessary to the protection of substantive
rights under these statutes. The intelligent siting of coastal energy in-
stallations, and the health, property, and environmental interests that
turn on these decisions are too important to subject to these capri-
cious arrangements.
An intelligent siting system would resurrect the idea of a form of
action from common law pleading in order to bring some coherence
to the system. One of the chief attributes of the forms of action at
common law was the fact that the form of action itself defined juris-
diction. Thus if Congress (or a state legislature) were to define a spe-
cial form of action to review siting decisions on the basis of the
record made in the consolidated permit proceedings, much of the
confusion about jurisdiction and venue, and thus much of the confu-
sion and expense associated with the current siting system, could be
eliminated.
V. INSURANCE
An important but frequently ignored element in any workable
tradeoff policy for industrial siting is the provision for adequate lia-
bility protection for the public should the installation have a cata-
strophic failure. In the event of a large explosion or major oil spill,
the damage might well exceed the resources of the company respon-
sible. Under present law, coastal residents are better protected from
oil spills than from potential LPG or LNG explosions. The inadequacy
of present liability arrangements may prove to be a considerable im-
pediment to siting such facilities. Few if any states have authority to
impose liability insurance requirements as part of the siting decision.
The case of the Morehead City LPG terminal illustrates these prob-
lems. In the event of a major explosion destroying the terminal, the
company might well be judgment proof, since the terminal and LPG
in it are likely to be the company's chief assets.' " I In that situation,
143. Issuance or denial of a state coastal zone permit may be appealed not only in state
but in federal administrative and judicial proceedings. Under the FCZMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1456
(c)(3)(A) (1976), a decision under a state coastal zone management plan may be appealed to
the Secretary of Commerce. The Secretary's decision in turn may be reviewed in the Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia.
144. Carteret County News-Times, Aug. 24, 1978, at IA, col. 1.
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the Federal Tort Claims Act' I I would not permit recovery against
the federal government for the Coast Guard's failure to promulgate
and enforce appropriate safety regulations. As a matter of law, failure
to promulgate that sort of regulation is not negligence within the
meaning of the act,' 16 even where the failure to do so may have con-
tributed to catastrophic explosions, such as those in the Texas City
Disaster.' 47 As Mr. Justice Jackson said in dissent, the act means
that the "King can only do little wrongs."' 148 Moreover, the act does
not provide for absolute liability where the government conducts an
ultrahazardous activity.' 4 Thus in the event of a disastrous accident
in the present regulatory situation, the possibility of severe uncom-
pensated damage is quite real. This possibility would remain even if,
as has been proposed,' I 0 the federal government establishes a special
liability fund for marine LNG/LPG terminal accidents. Although such
a fund would assure easier and more complete recovery, funds of this
nature can also function as effective limitations on liability, and leave
substantial uncompensated damage.' I'
The present statutory scheme governing oil spills provides better
protection and is better suited to a workable tradeoff policy. Tanker
and oil barge operations and design are closely regulated by the Coast
Guard under a variety of statutes, including the recent Port and
Tanker Safety Act, which further tightens regulatory standards.' 5 2
This Coast Guard regulatory scheme is sufficiently thorough to pre-
empt most state regulatory efforts,' 1 5 and sufficiently stringent to
reduce chances of large oil spills. Coast Guard strike forces are re-
sponsible for coordinating clean-up operations in the event of any
spill, and have proven reasonably effective over the past eight years
in limiting damages. I I I Under the Clean Water Act, those responsible
145. 28 U.S.C. § § 2671-2680 (1976).
146. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 43-44 (1953).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 60 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 44-45; Nelms v. Laird, 406 U.S. 797 (1972). Thus the federal government is
subject to a taxer standard of care when it conducts or regulates an ultrahazardous activity
than a private party engaged in the same activity would be. Nelms involved sonic boom dam-
age to a home in North Carolina from military aircraft. North Carolina law was held to make
the plane owner (the United States) liable in the absence of sovereign immunity.
150. See, e.g., H.R. 1414, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § § 341-353 (1979) (liability fund for
liquid gas terminals; includes liability limitations).
151. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (upholding
liability limitations in the Atomic Energy Act, which involved a mechanism for pooling
claims in that fashion).
152. 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. 11 1978).
153. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978);see also notes 108-111 and
accompanying text supra.
154. See R. WINSLOW, HARD AGROUND: THE STORY OF THE ARGO MERCHANT
OIL SPILL (1978) (background on Coast Guard oil spill clean-up program).
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for causing an oil spill are liable without fault for the costs the federal
government incurs in cleaning up the spill and for the costs of restor-
ing the environmental damage."1
Fortunately for those threatened by possible spills, the federal
clean-up fund does not preempt either state remedies against those
responsible for spills1 1 6 or state clean-up funds raised through a tax
on conveyancing.' I 7 Thus the state may impose additional require-
ments for oil spill control on oil terminals, may require terminal op-
erators to support clean-up funds, and may provide state law remedies
against those responsible for the spills.' s I
North Carolina has elected to institute a state clean-up fund, which
like the federal fund, operates on a revolving basis instead of being
financed by a conveyancing tax.' 5 9 The state may bring an action for
damages against any person causing the spill for the costs the state
incurs in clean-up and environmental restoration.' 60 In addition,
local citizens may bring an admiralty action for damages to their com-
mercial fishing and resort operations. ' 61 Thus under present law, the
possibility of severe oil spills is reduced by federal regulation, the
possibility of severe spill damage by federal clean-up teams, and the
possibility of uncompensated damage by state and federal restoration
efforts and citizens' damages actions against those responsible.
155. The only exceptions to the liability without fault requirements are (1) acts of God,
(2) acts of war, (3) negligence on the part of the United States, or (4) an act or omission of
a third party. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0(1) (Supp. III 1979). Predictably, the fund has not
proven self-sustaining, as clean-up costs regularly exceed recoveries because of liability limi-
tations, judgment-proof defendants, compromised claims, etc. See, e.g., Steuart Transp. Co.
v. Allied Towing, 596 F.2d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1979) (United States recovers only 25% of
clean-up costs in barge oil spill because of libility limitation).
156. Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing, 596 F.2d 609, 620-21 (4th Cir. 1979) (ruling
that Clean Water Act did not preempt state tort remedies against those responsible for spills,
even where recoveries would have been barred to the federal government by the liability
limitation).
157. See Portland Pipeline Corp. v. Env. Improvement Comm'n, 307 A.2d 1 (Me.),
appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973) (tax); Askew v. American Waterway Operators,
Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 330-36 (1973) (financial responsibility).
158. See Askew v. American Waterway Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1973)
(no per se preemption of control gear requirements in absence of demonstrated conflict with
federal regulations).
159. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.87 (1978).
160. Id. § 143-215.90 (1978); 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0(5) (Supp. III 1979) (authorizing
similar federal right of action).
161. Clean Water Act § 311(o)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o)(1) (1976) (preserving private
rights of action for oil spill damage). Recoveries against vessels for oil spills are limited under
the Federal Limited Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § § 181-189 (1976), to the value of the ship
and cargo. Askew v. American Waterway Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 330 (1973). How-
ever, since the costs of clean-up and environmental damage are apparently not covered by
this limitation and do not count against it, there might be a sufficient sum to cover damage
to private property and loss of business. See id., at 331.
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Coastal residents have brought coastal energy siting to a standstill
because of the threats these installations pose to their livelihoods,
lives, and property. Unless these dangers are adequately addressed
through some form of tradeoff policy, and the resultant political
compromise turned into enforceable legal requirements, this opposi-
tion is not likely to yield to brute political force or energy crisis in-
cantations.
In order to make a tradeoff policy work, significant gaps in federal
safety standards and liability requirements for gas terminals and envi-
ronmental requirements for refineries must be filled. Two other
problems, however, are the primary obstacles to a workable tradeoff
policy for rapid siting: first, exclusive federal regulatory authority
over many aspects of these facilities; and second, the needless frag-
mentation and proliferation of permitting procedures and routes for
appellate review.
These obstacles may be overcome by consolidating decisions about
necessary permits into a single proceeding before a forum with ade-
quate authority to order additional protections or appropriate off-
sets. The consolidation would help assure that appropriate enforce-
able permits would incorporate these requirements. The decision on
all permits, state and federal, and on the EIS and mitigation measures
should be directly reviewable in one action in the U.S. court of ap-
peals for the circuit in which the project was to be located. All ques-
tions of federal and state law relevant to the project's siting would
have to be raised in that action or foregone. Participation in a permit
proceeding would be a prerequisite for a party to litigate, and all
issues not raised below would be waived.
The consolidation of many of these permit proceedings on the ad-
ministrative level can and is being accomplished by EPA and by the
states under existing statutory authority. The consolidation of appel-
late proceedings, however, will require congressional action. The
chief objection to consolidation is likely to be the requirement that
the court of appeals decide state law challenges as well as federal
ones. If federal claims were consolidated, however, the doctrine of
pendent claim jurisdiction would authorize the court to decide state
law claims with "a common nucleus of operative facts."' 6 2 The fed-
eral appellate court, of course, is constitutionally bound to apply the
state law as interpreted by the state's appellate courts. By definition,
almost any colorable state environmental law claim would have a fed-
162. United Mineworkers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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eral counterpart which would be raised in the federal proceeding.
Since it would involve the same facility and evidence, the interests of
judicial economy and speedy decision sought to be advanced by the
doctrine of pendent claim jurisdiction would be well served here.
Pendent claim jurisdiction is discretionary with the courts, how-
ever, and some judges might decline to decide these issues on absten-
tion or other grounds. Given the strong national interest in reaching
rapid, intelligent, and final siting decisions for these facilities, it would
be sensible for Congress to command the courts to decide, foreclosing
these opportunities for delay. Certainly federalism is better served by
the rapid and careful consideration of litigants' full legal claims than
by the interminable delay and expense abstention often entails.' 63
Congress' broad definition of the cause of action here would guar-
antee a final decision by the reviewing court since the doctrine of res
judicata (claim preclusion) prevents the litigants from "splitting their
cause of action" between different courts and proceedings while the
doctrine of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) will prevent the re-
litigation of issues in other forums by litigants, whether or not they
were parties to the original action. ' 64
This consolidated permit proceeding on the administrative level
would best be conducted by the state, since state officials may be
sensitive enough to electoral pressure to give coastal residents some
bargaining leverage in the proceeding. Where the state had a federally
approved consolidated permit program (pursuant to EPA's proposed
permit consolidation regulations) and a refinery or oil terminal were
proposed, the state should be delegated the authority to issue the
dredge-fill permit for the project and the responsibility to prepare
the EIS on the entire project. 1 6 s The delegation could require the
state to consider certain specific mitigation measures in the EIS, and
would empower the state to order those or other mitigation measures
and offsets under authority of NEPA. Where the state had a federally
approved coastal program, and a gas terminal were proposed, the
state would be delegated the dredge-fill permit and NEPA responsibil-
ities in a similar fashion.
Where the state did not have the requisite federally approved pro-
grams, a federal consolidated permit proceeding would be conducted
to consider offsets and mitigation measures under NEPA. In the case
of refineries, the EPA administrator would make these decisions; in
the case of gas terminals, the commandant of the Coast Guard would.
163. See note 138 supra.
164. See note 142 supra.
165. Under present law, decisions on dredge-fill permits in tidal waters may not be dele-
gated to the states. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. III 1979).
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(These agencies have primary responsibility for the safety and envi-
ronmental aspects of these facilities.) In a case of a jurisdictional dis-
pute between federal agencies over aspects of these projects, the
director of the Office of Management and Budget would resolve the
jurisdictional issue.
Appeals of the state or federal decision would be as follows. The
adequacy of the EIS and mitigation measures would be reviewed by
the federal Council on Environmental Quality and written opinions
issued; the adequacy of mitigation measures or offsets concerning en-
dangered species would be reviewed by the cabinet level committee
on endangered species issues, which has the power to order additional
mitigation measures or to reject the project entirely. Other federal
agencies would already have participated in the proceeding at the ad-
ministrative level.
The court of appeals would review these administrative decisions
in an expeditious fashion, in order to assure that the decisions to
grant, deny, or modify the permit were based on substantial evidence.
Offsets would be reviewed and modified where the permit applicant
could show that they would make the installation financially infeasi-
ble. No modification of offsets would be permitted, however, where
opponents showed that the offset was substantially related to the
prevention of greater financial losses to other local residents and in-
dustries or where they were substantially related to the preservation
of an endangered or commercially important animal species.
The details of this proposal are less important than its recognition
that the fragility of the coastal environment will make coastal resi-
dents and environmentalists formidable opponents of coastal energy
installations. Unless a forum is provided for the full and fair litigation
of all issues concerning permits, a forum with the authority to make
appropriate and enforceable permit modifications, these interests will
continue to paralyze, or at least delay, the siting of necessary coastal
energy installations.
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